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C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness and Beauty, ed. David J. Baggett, 
Gary R. Habermas, and Jerry L. Walls. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 2008. 268 pp. $23 (paper).
DAVID L. O’HARA, Augustana College (SD)
Someone at my college recently asked me whether C. S. Lewis should 
be considered a philosopher. The new volume C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: 
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty contains fifteen essays that support the claim 
that Lewis does merit the title. Most of the essays were first presented as 
papers at the 2005 C. S. Lewis Summer Institute at Oxford and Cambridge. 
Some articles offer commentary or expansions on Lewis’s views. Others 
show the continued relevance of Lewis’s arguments for our time. Still oth-
ers use Lewis’s ideas as a starting-point for reasoning about things Lewis 
himself did not touch on. A small number of them take issue with Lewis’s 
views, and a larger number attempt to defend Lewis from his critics, espe-
cially John Beversluis.
In his Introduction, Jerry Walls makes the case that Lewis was a phi-
losopher. Lewis held an Oxford degree in Philosophy; his first teaching 
position was as lecturer in Philosophy; and perhaps most importantly, 
Lewis was engaged by philosophers of such stature as G. E. M. Anscombe 
and Antony Flew in his lifetime, and he continues to be engaged by oth-
ers forty-five years after his death. Taken as a whole, Lewis’s work con-
tains real contributions to philosophy in his time that continue to merit 
our attention.
On the other hand, the title suggests that the view that Lewis was a 
philosopher is not widely held. After all, no one has to write a book called 
Aristotle as Philosopher or Quine as Philosopher. As Walls points out, one of 
Lewis’s friends once said that if one were to make a list of the most im-
portant Oxford philosophers, Lewis wouldn’t make the list. In the second 
chapter of this book, Flew denies that Lewis was a philosopher at all.
But why not? What is it that makes one a philosopher? Rigor of argu-
ment? Correct use of technical jargon and familiarity with current litera-
ture? Attention to the history of philosophy? To varying degrees, these 
essays make the case that Lewis had all of these qualities.
Throughout the book we are reminded that Lewis held that the human 
mind is capable of significant comprehension of real truth, goodness, and 
beauty. These three transcendentals named in the subtitle also describe 
the organization of the book. The first section of the book loosely concerns 
truth, more specifically Lewis’s belief in the importance of not giving up 
on seeking truth.
The opening essay, by Peter Kreeft, offers an overview of Lewis’s think-
ing about truth, goodness, and beauty. Kreeft asks, “How many writers 
tell us more than Lewis about all three things, the only things we need to 
know?” (p. 26). Kreeft’s essay is a celebration of Lewis and a reminder of 
how easy it is to forget the most important things.
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The second chapter is a transcript of an interview with Antony Flew, 
conducted by Gary Habermas. It chiefly concerns Flew’s memories of 
Lewis and Flew’s recent shift to theism. Flew says that Lewis was a “first-
rate thinker” but not a philosopher. Curiously, a little later, Flew refers to 
St. Paul as a “first-rate philosopher, a first-rate thinker,” (p. 44) but Flew 
never explains what he means by these epithets.
Victor Reppert’s article “Defending the Dangerous Idea: An Update on 
Lewis’s Argument from Reason” responds to critics of his book, in which 
he attempted to reformulate and advance Lewis’s argument against natu-
ralism that Anscombe found lacking.
In chapter 4, David Horner provides a very helpful overview of the tri-
lemma argument, a summary of the case against it, and a nice defense of 
it against one of its chief critics. Especially worthwhile is Horner’s clearly 
written account of what makes a Great Moral Teacher (GMT) and, with it, 
his case for regarding Jesus as both a GMT and divine.
Jean Bethke Elshtain’s piece is beautifully written and compelling. In-
viting us to consider Lewis’s prescience in The Abolition of Man, Elshtain 
argues that (a) a dogmatic belief in objective value is a safeguard against 
slavery and tyranny, (b) the alternative to such views is precisely the rel-
ativism—under the guise of science and civility and peace—that is being 
promulgated in so much contemporary education, and (c) human life as 
Lewis saw it is not so much a problem to be surmounted as a reality to be 
embraced and lived as a gift. The upshot is a defense of humanity broadly 
defined, over against what Elshtain perceives as successive narrowings of 
the definition of humanity.
The articles in the second section deal with goodness. All of them agree 
that Lewis’s view is that the goodness of God is neither in question nor 
unintelligible. The question, then, is whether Lewis’s position is coherent 
and tenable.
David Baggett defends Lewis against Beversluis’s charge that Lewis was 
forced, after the death of his wife Joy, to abandon his belief in the good-
ness of God. Beversluis has argued that to be consistent, Lewis must have 
become an Ockhamist with regard to God’s goodness. Baggett insists that 
this is a misconstrual of Lewis’s real position, which is that though mourn-
ing may obscure God’s goodness, God’s goodness is nevertheless not arbi-
trary. Baggett’s essay provides an interesting approach to the Euthyphro 
dilemma through the combined lenses of Lewis’s life and writings.
Kevin Kinghorn tries to fill in a perceived gap in Lewis’s account of 
faith. Lewis spoke of people becoming or ceasing to become Christians, as 
though those were long processes that admitted of gradations of faith. But 
Lewis never gave an adequate account of what faith is, so Kinghorn specu-
lates about what Lewis’s account of faith might have been. His conclusion: 
faith “involves becoming the kind of person who [would] plead the cross 
of Christ once the truth about Christ became known” (p. 142). So faith 
cannot be mere intellectual assent to true propositions about God. David 
Rozema’s subsequent essay approaches belief from a different angle, one 
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that reads Lewis closely and critically. Rozema draws on Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein to remind us of what we already know: trust in someone reli-
able is itself a kind of evidence. Christian faith is not a blind leap, but it is 
trust in someone whom we have come to regard as deserving that trust.
Matthew Lee focuses on the problem of hell as a key component of the 
problem of evil. Is God a tormentor? If so, doesn’t that mean God is not 
good? Lee argues that Lewis’s belief in hell is consistent with his belief in 
the goodness of God, since Lewis holds that hell is not so much a place of 
torment designed by God as a state of willful self-torment out of which the 
damned refuse to be taken.
Michael Peterson’s excellent article is the sort one wants to show to un-
dergraduates as an example of clear thinking and good writing. Peterson 
begins with a masterful summary of the atheistic arguments from evil, 
focusing especially on the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. Pe-
terson offers a fine account of the basic theistic defenses against this argu-
ment; generally they deny the factual premise that there is gratuitous evil. 
But this denial, Peterson claims, usually forces us to give a nod to some 
kind of moral agnosticism. Since Lewis refuses to make this gesture, he 
instead attacks the theological premise, arguing that our ignorance more 
chiefly concerns the way that omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenev-
olence must interact. Ultimately, Peterson argues, Lewis held that the pos-
sibility of gratuitous evil is not only consistent with a good God, it is nec-
essary in order for moral freedom to be non-trivial. By carefully attending 
to Lewis’s argument, Peterson vividly illustrates the philosophical rigor 
and dimension of Lewis’s thought and hints at the profundity of its roots 
in Anglican theology and ancient philosophical theology.
The third section of the book concerns Lewis’s view of beauty. Interest-
ingly, this book contains some very good writing, some of it quite beauti-
ful. Maybe one of the chief philosophical virtues of Lewis is his (appar-
ently contagious) clarity of thought and expression.
Philip Tallon observes that “Lewis’s work is marked by a trust in the 
value of pursuing beauty in the philosophic enterprise” (p. 200). He ar-
gues, against Hick, that discussions of theodicy are strengthened, not 
weakened, by aesthetic considerations like the ones Lewis brings to his 
own writings on theodicy.
Russell Howell’s contribution, “Lewis’s Miracles and Mathematical El-
egance,” examines mathematical elegance as providing an argument that 
parallels Lewis’s own defense of miracles against the challenge of natural-
ism. His point is that elegance, like other forms of beauty, is not a mere hu-
man convention but an example of transcendent signs in the world. Howell’s 
chapter does not really need Lewis, and is really a defense of theism against 
naturalism, one that happens to be somewhat akin to Lewis’s thinking.
Michael Muth’s chapter, “Beastly Metaphysics: The Beasts of Narnia 
and Lewis’s Reclamation of Medieval Sacramental Metaphysics” is, for 
my money, one of the best in the volume. Lewis, as a philosopher inter-
ested in the history of philosophy, was mostly concerned with medieval 
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and Renaissance philosophy. Sadly, this is the only chapter in the book 
that addresses this aspect of Lewis’s thought. Thankfully, Muth does it ex-
cellently by examining Lewis’s use of ancient and medieval bestiaries and 
connecting this with the Augustinian sacramental tradition in philosophi-
cal theology. A sacramental view, he argues, rescues individual creations 
from the ontological erasure that follows from so many other versions 
of metaphysics. Muth is not sanguine about the future of beauty in mar-
ketplace-driven academia, but Lewis’s writing provides a hopeful—and 
beautiful—alternative to the current intellectual environment.
In the final chapter, Gregory Bassham, in his typically lucid style, makes 
a quick case for the importance of fantasy, not only for the imagination, 
but also for Christian philosophy. In a nutshell, Bassham argues for the 
important role fantastic literature plays in helping us to see familiar things 
from a new angle—which is, after all, one of the chief aims of philosophy.
I have two criticisms of this book. First, I found myself correcting the 
index quite a lot, penciling in important references that were omitted. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the book left me wanting more. Lewis devoted 
a good deal of his writing to arguing with philosophers like Spencer and 
Nietzsche. Other philosophers like Bergson and Bernardus Silvestris per-
meate Lewis’s writing. Yet none of these figures is mentioned in the book. 
Even if Lewis wasn’t a philosopher in some narrow sense, he constantly 
engaged figures like these from the history of philosophy, and surely that 
merits mention in a volume of this sort. Or perhaps it merits mention in 
a second volume. After all, taken together these essays make a solid case 
for considering Lewis a philosopher. If that is the case, then there may be 
a good deal more Lewisian philosophical writing to come.
This book should be on the shelf of every college library, and will make 
a helpful addition to classes on the philosophy of Lewis. 
Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love’s Wisdom, ed. Norman Wirzba 
and Bruce Ellis Benson. Indiana University Press, 2008. viii + 263 pp.
N. N. TRAKAKIS, Monash University and Deakin University
The usual practice in philosophical discussions on love has been to be-
gin with certain reflections or theories on love and then to apply these or 
test them against various domains such as politics and gender relations. 
This volume reverses this process by looking at how our very theoretical 
or reflective practices, philosophy and theology included, can be trans-
formed by the discipline of love. The very etymology of ‘philosophy,’ in 
fact, presupposes that the attainment of wisdom requires the practice of 
love in some form. Philosophers, as the editors note in their Introduction, 
have tended to sever the connection between love and wisdom, seeing the 
former as an impediment to the attainment of the latter (love as a passion 
